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A MORE PERFECT PICKERING TEST: JANUS V. AFSCME
COUNCIL 31 AND THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
SPEECH
Alexandra J. Gilewicz*

ABSTRACT
In June 2018, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited—and, for the
American labor movement, long-feared—decision in Janus v. AFSCME Council
31. The decision is expected to have a major impact on public sector employee
union membership, but could have further impact on public employees’ speech
rights in the workplace. Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito’s broad
interpretation of whether work-related speech constitutes a “matter of public
concern” may have opened the floodgates to substantially more litigation by
employees asserting that their employers have violated their First Amendment
rights. Claims that would have previously been unequivocally foreclosed may now
be permitted. This Note proposes a test to allow courts to meaningfully respond to
this influx of claims. By explicitly incorporating the “social value” of public
employee speech into the Pickering balance test as a factor of equal weight
alongside the existing factors—the individual employee’s right to speech and the
employer’s interest in operating an effective workplace—courts can make
meaningful sense of the doctrinal conflict Janus created while also respecting and
promoting the unique role public employee speech plays in public discourse.
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INTRODUCTION
In the final days of its 2018 term, the United States Supreme
1
Court decided Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, a concerted effort that
had been several years in the making. A series of Supreme Court
decisions in the previous decade laid the groundwork for this
monumental judgment, rejecting decades of precedent and embracing the conservative majority’s radical interpretation of the
2
3
First Amendment. Decades earlier, in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
the Court upheld the so-called agency fee arrangement, which
permitted public sector unions to collect “fair share” fees to cover
the union’s cost of collective bargaining on behalf of all employees. In Janus, the Court overruled this longstanding precedent by
holding that public sector employees could not be compelled by
their union to pay agency fees without violating First Amendment
4
protections against compelled speech. Commentators mused on
the case’s likely impact on the collective power of organized labor
in the workplace, anticipating an exodus of paying union members
who would now recognize that they will be able to reap the benefits
of union representation without having to pay to receive those
5
benefits.
In writing for the majority, Justice Alito asserted that public sector union activity necessarily involves speech that constitutes matters of “public concern”; compelling employees to support this
speech through mandatory agency fees therefore runs afoul of
6
non-union members’ First Amendment rights. But in the process
of freeing non-union members from allegedly unconstitutional
compelled speech, Justice Alito may have opened up government
employers to liability for First Amendment violations from which
7
the Court had previously protected them. Justice Alito’s reliance
on an expansive definition of “public concern” puts the Janus deci-

1. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
2. Alice O’Brien, Symposium: Janus’ Radical Rewrite of the First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 27, 2018, 9:58 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-janus-radicalrewrite-of-the-first-amendment/.
3. 431 U.S. 209 (1976).
4. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
5. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, Is This the End of Public Sector Unions in America?, THE
ATLANTIC (June 27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/janusafscme-public-sector-unions/563879/.
6. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
7. Id. at 2498 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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sion in conflict with employee workplace speech doctrine after
8
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. As Justice Kagan highlighted in her searing
dissent, such a broad formulation of what constitutes a matter of
public concern might render government entities subject to significantly more litigation on speech claims that had previously been
foreclosed. 9
Responding to this critique, Justice Alito pointed to the significant difference in scale between individual employment disputes
10
and collective union activity. But it’s unclear why this distinction
should matter for First Amendment purposes. Further, the linedrawing problems inherent to a test that turns on “scale” are significant. For example, during oral arguments for Janus, Justice Breyer
struggled to find the appropriate line to determine when a re11
quested wage increase becomes a matter of public concern. Justice Sotomayor went a step further, suggesting that, according to
the petitioner’s argument, any decision made by a public employer
arguably affects the public fisc and is therefore a matter of public
12
concern.
If the dissenting justices’ perception of Janus’ expansion of the
meaning of “public concern” is correct, how do lower courts confront this impending influx of employee speech claims of unprecedented scope? More importantly, how should courts deal with
these claims in a manner that recognizes the unique role public
employees play in our public discourse?
I propose that the Supreme Court adjust the Pickering balancing
test by explicitly considering the public interest value of public
employee speech. Specifically, I suggest that a third factor be added to the balancing test. Currently, when confronted with a public
employee First Amendment claim, courts must balance only the
rights of the employee as an individual citizen to comment on matters of public concern against her government employer’s interest
in operating an effective workplace. My proposed amendment to
the Pickering test would also require courts to explicitly incorporate
the public interest value of the employee’s speech as a third, independent factor of equal weight.
Incorporating the public value of employee speech into the Pickering balancing test will make post-Janus First Amendment claims
more manageable and ideologically consistent. It will reconcile the

8. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
9. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2498 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 2472–73.
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 64–65, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun.
Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466).
12. Id. at 69–70.
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Court’s employee speech doctrine while still ensuring that employee speech on meaningful workplace matters is protected.
In Part I of this Note, I outline Supreme Court precedent on
agency fees and public employee speech protections, highlighting
the doctrinal tension Janus creates. Part II considers in more depth
the public interest value of employee speech, which I will generally
call “social value.” It also highlights a selection of existing proposals for heightened First Amendment protections that would
apply to sector- or situation-specific circumstances, proposals that I
suggest would be better addressed in a more broadly applicable,
modified balancing test. Part III discusses the proposed threepronged balancing test, illustrates some potential applications, and
anticipates counterarguments.
I.

Dueling Doctrines

This section lays out relevant Supreme Court precedent with respect to public sector union agency fees, starting with Abood v. De13
14
troit Bd. of Educ. and ending with Janus. It then walks through the
15
line of cases, originating under Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., that governs employee First Amendment rights in the workplace. The shifting contours of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, specifically as it is applied to workplace speech and agency fees,
converge and become apparent in Janus, a point discussed at the
closing of this section.
A. The Road to Janus
In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., Detroit public school teachers
filed suit against the Detroit Board of Education and the Detroit
16
Federation of Teachers. The plaintiff teachers challenged the
agency shop clause in the union’s collective bargaining agreement
17
with the Board of Education. Under this arrangement, even
teachers who did not wish to be members of the union were required to pay a specified amount, called an “agency fee,” that
18
funded union activities. These activities included representation
of the teachers in collective bargaining, grievance procedures, and
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

431 U.S. 209 (1976).
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
431 U.S. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 211.
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other workplace matters. However, it also included the union’s political activities, including its contributions to political candidates
19
and lobbying expenses. The plaintiffs argued that this arrangement violated the First Amendment rights of those non-member
20
teachers who did not support the union’s activities.
The Abood Court recognized that potential First Amendment
problems existed in compelling employees to financially support
21
their collective bargaining representative. Nonetheless, the Court
upheld agency fees as constitutional, holding that the state’s interest in labor peace was a compelling one that was legitimately served
22
by the existing agency fee arrangement. This holding was consistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent that upheld
the permissibility of agency fees under the Railway Labor Act. In
those cases, the Court relied on congressional intent prioritizing
23
stability in management-labor relations. For Congress, the requirement that nonmembers pay agency fees facilitated labor
peace by enabling unions’ exclusive representation of workers and
24
thereby reducing worker-led strikes. Exclusive representation also
ensured that unions had sufficient funds to advocate for their
25
members’ interests.
However, in Abood and its predecessors, the Court held a union’s
ability to require these fees was constitutional only if the funds
generated by the fees were not used to further the union’s explicitly ideological or partisan activities. Specifically, a union could only
use these fees to fund activities related to its duties as a collective
26
bargaining representative. The Court recognized that this may
present a challenging line-drawing problem, as it may be difficult
to discern an activity performed in the union’s role as the exclusive
bargaining representative of public sector employees from a union
27
activity which is expressly political. Nevertheless, due to
longstanding precedent, congressional intent, and the fact that the
arrangement had proved workable, the Court found its decision to
be the correct balance to strike, holding that any interference with

19. See id. at 213, 215.
20. Id. at 213.
21. Id. at 222.
22. Id. at 224–26.
23. See id. at 217–23 (discussing Railway Employees’ Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
(1956) and Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)).
24. See id. at 219 (discussing the holding of Hanson and highlighting that “Congress
determined that it would promote peaceful labor relations to permit a union and an employer to conclude an agreement requiring employees who obtain the benefit of union representation to share its cost, and that legislative judgment was surely an allowable one.”).
25. See id. at 220–21.
26. See id. at 235–36.
27. Id. at 236.
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employees’ First Amendment protections that may be presented by
28
agency fees was “constitutionally justified.”
Non-right-to-work states—those states that, prior to the decision
in Janus, did require non-union-member public sector employees
29
to pay agency fees to the union that represents their workplace —
and their municipalities relied on Abood’s holding for decades in
drafting their collective bargaining agreements with public em30
ployee unions. The Abood doctrine has remained “remarkably stable,” as Justice Kagan points out in her dissent in Janus, striking a
balance between employees’ constitutional right to free expression
and government entities’ right to regulate their workplaces via exclusive bargaining agreements with unions representing their em31
ployees. As intended, for those states that chose to require them,
agency fees had long facilitated government entities’ compelling
32
interest in labor peace.
Over thirty-five years later, the Supreme Court brought the issue
of agency fees to the forefront in the dicta of two cases, Knox v.
33
34
SEIU, Local 1000 and Harris v. Quinn. The petitioners in Knox
challenged the defendant union’s imposition of a one-time “Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight Back
35
Fund.” The Court found the fund, which was to be used for lobbying the California electorate on issues important to the union in
upcoming elections, to be political in nature and therefore uncon36
stitutional under Abood. In Harris v. Quinn, the Court held in a 5-4
decision that the plaintiffs, home health care workers in Illinois,
37
were not full-fledged state employees. Unlike other public workers in Illinois, they could therefore not be compelled, under

28. See id. at 217–23.
29. In contrast, states with right-to-work laws did not permit unions to require employees to pay dues in order to be members. See Right to Work Laws, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS,
https://www.workplacefairness.org/unions-right-to-work-laws (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
30. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2487
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Brief for the States of N.Y., Alaska, Conn., Del., Haw., Iowa, Ky., Me., Md., Mass.,
Minn., N.J., N.M., N.C., Or., Pa., R.I., Vt., Va., and Wash., and the District of Columbia as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun.
Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (discussing the states’ experiences that “exclusive
representation supported by agency fees can be an indispensable tool” in preventing the
“devastating public-sector work stoppages that caused disruptions in critical government
services”).
33. 567 U.S. 298 (2012).
34. 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2638–44 (2014).
35. Knox, 567 U.S. at 304.
36. See id. at 315.
37. See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644.
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Abood’s authority, to join and pay dues to the union that represent38
ed similarly situated state employees.
While the two cases were decided on these respectively narrow
grounds, Justice Alito’s opinions raised the question of whether
agency fees in general should be considered unconstitutionally
39
compelled speech. In Knox, he highlighted that the Court’s past
decisions authorizing unions to collect agency fees from nonmember employees and allowing them to operate through an opt-out
system “approach, if they do not cross, the limit of the what the
40
First Amendment can tolerate.” Justice Alito characterized these
conditions as “substantial impingement[s]” on First Amendment
rights and expressed concern with the extent of these infringe41
ments.
In Harris, Justice Alito again highlighted portions of the reasoning in Abood as an “anomaly,” questioning the conclusion that
agency fees were necessary to maintain the state’s interest in labor
peace and suggesting they were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
that interest as to justify their significant intrusion on First
42
Amendment rights. Justice Alito further argued that Abood failed
to take into account the differences between the nature of core union issues in the public sector and the private sector; in the former,
he asserted, core union issues inherently are political ones. 43 Consequently, there is a significant conceptual difficulty in drawing a
line between issues related to the union’s role as a collective bar44
gaining agent and its political activities.
Contemporary critics pointed out how Justice Alito’s musings
appeared to run into conflict with Supreme Court precedent regarding employee speech protections under the First Amend45
46
ment, highlighting the opinion’s inconsistency and its incoher-

38. Id. at 2638–44.
39. Knox, 567 U.S. at 313–14.
40. Id. at 314.
41. Id. at 317.
42. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2630–34.
43. Id. at 2632–33.
44. See id. at 2632.
45. Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After
Knox v. Seiu, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1065–67 (July 2013) (arguing in part
that “[i]t appears that the only robust free speech rights government employees have is the
right to refuse to support unions”).
46. Catherine Fisk, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: Court Departs from Federalism,
First
Amendment
Jurisprudence,
SCOTUSBLOG
(July
3,
2014,
10:28
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/harris-v-quinnsymposium-court-departs-fromfederalism-first-amendment-jurisprudence/.
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47

ence, and called on the Court to explain its doctrinal asymme48
tries.
In his majority opinion in Janus, Justice Alito tied together the
threads of dicta from Knox and Harris. Justice Alito asserted that
public sector union activity, in general and in this specific case, inherently implicates many political issues that are considered to be
49
of public concern. For example, petitioner Mark Janus was employed by the State of Illinois, which at the time of the ruling was
suffering from severe budget problems, in part due to insufficiently
50
funded public sector pensions. Former Republican Governor
Bruce Rauner and the state’s public sector unions “disagree[d]
51
sharply” as to how to appropriately resolve these issues. Under
Justice Alito’s framing, this disagreement suggested that essential
union matters like pension funding may ultimately be political disputes at their core. Furthermore, the majority asserted, union
speech during the collective bargaining process can broach significant matters of public policy. As an example, Justice Alito pointed
to the significant role public teachers’ unions and their collective
bargaining processes play in public discourse surrounding “fun52
damental questions of education policy.” Consequently, compelling employees to subsidize collective bargaining constituted compelled speech on matters “overwhelmingly of substantial public
53
concern.” For the majority, the Abood rule authorizing agency
fees, so long as they were not put to use toward political purposes,
54
had proven to be unworkable. Finally, the rule was formally overturned; under Janus, public sector unions can no longer require
non-member public employees to pay agency fees for services rendered without running afoul of those employees’ First Amendment
rights.

47. See Jason Walta, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: Abood and the Limits of Cognitive Dissonance, SCOTUSBLOG (July 1, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/harrisv-quinn-symposium-abood-and-the-limits-of-cognitive-dissonance/.
48. See Samuel Bagenstos, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: The Coming Conflict in Public Employee Speech Law and the Immediate Risks to People with Disabilities, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30,
2014, 9:46 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/harris-v-quinn-symposium-thecoming-conflict-in-public-employee-speech-law-and-the-immediate-risks-to-people-withdisabilities/.
49. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2475.
50. Id. at 2474–75.
51. Id. at 2475.
52. Id. at 2475–76.
53. Id. at 2476.
54. Id. at 2481–82.
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B. Pickering and its Successors
In a separate line of cases originating with Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 55 the Supreme Court has shaped the contours of the free
speech rights granted to individual public employees. Justices Alito
and Kagan disagreed in their respective opinions about the influence the holding in Janus will have on this doctrine.
In Pickering, the plaintiff public school teacher was dismissed
from his job for sending a letter to a local paper that was critical of
56
the defendant Board of Education’s approach to raising revenue.
The plaintiff challenged his dismissal, raising First and Fourteenth
Amendment claims, and the Supreme Court ultimately found that
57
his speech rights had been violated by the termination. The
Court maintained that public employees do not relinquish their
First Amendment rights on matters of public concern merely by
58
accepting public employment. The Court also recognized, however, that the State’s interest in regulating its employees’ speech is
different from its interest in regulating speech of the general pub59
lic. In so holding, the Court laid out a balancing test that lower
courts must apply in assessing similar First Amendment claims asserted by public employees: When an employee argues that an adverse action taken against him violated his First Amendment rights,
courts must balance the interest of employees and their rights as
citizens to comment on issues of public concern against the needs
60
of the employer to effectively administer public services.
The Pickering Court highlighted the social value of the plaintiff’s
speech in this case, stating that “[t]eachers are, as a class, the
members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the
61
schools should be spent.” In this way, it recognized the “special
contribution” to public discourse that public employees are
62
uniquely capable of making.

55. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
56. Id. at 563.
57. Id. at 565.
58. Id. at 568.
59. Id.
60. See id. (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.”).
61. Id. at 572.
62. Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 119
(2006).
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In Connick v. Myers, the respondent, an assistant district attorney,
63
faced an unwanted transfer to a different role. In an attempt to
avoid the transfer and communicate her displeasure with the proposed change, she solicited input from her coworkers on the office’s transfer policy and other workplace conditions by way of a
64
questionnaire. She was later terminated and told that her distri65
bution of the questionnaire constituted insubordination. Although the respondent later filed suit alleging her First Amendment speech rights had been violated, the Court found that her
distribution of the questionnaire could not possibly be construed
as affecting a matter of public concern, and that consequently, the
Court was not required to scrutinize the reasons for her dis66
charge.
Connick clarified that matters of personal interest—including
most personnel issues—are not matters of public concern and
67
therefore are not analyzed under the Pickering balancing test. It
thus established the question of whether the implicated speech was
a matter of public concern as a threshold inquiry for undergoing
68
the Pickering test. The Court provided little guidance as to what
should constitute a matter of public concern, only stating that the
matter “must be determined by the content, form, and context of a
given statement, as determined by the full record.” 69
In the respondent’s case, the Court found that only one of the
questions on her circulated questionnaire was a matter of public
concern. The remaining questions did not concern the public and
were instead extensions of her individual dispute over her trans70
fer. In the case of the single question that possibly implicated a
matter of public concern—whether district attorneys were being
pressured to support certain political campaigns—the Court found
that posing the question had the potential to undermine office relations and her supervisor’s authority, and that consequently, her
71
termination did not violate her First Amendment rights. The

63. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).
64. Id. at 141.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 146.
67. Id. at 147.
68. Id. (“We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest,
absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in
reaction to the employee’s behavior.”).
69. Id. at 147–48.
70. Id. at 148.
71. Id. at 154.
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Court refused to “constitutionalize the employee grievance” in the
72
name of First Amendment protections.
Garcetti v. Ceballos narrowed the scope of First Amendmentprotected employee speech even further than Connick already had
by erecting a critical distinction between speech an employee en73
gages in as a citizen versus speech engaged in as an employee.
The Court held in Garcetti that statements made pursuant to an
employee’s official duties are not subject to the Pickering balancing
74
test. The respondent, another prosecutor, wrote a memo recommending dismissal of a case due to significant misrepresentations
75
in an affidavit that had been used to execute a search warrant. His
superiors proceeded with the prosecution anyway, and tension
76
arose between the parties. Ceballos filed suit, alleging First and
Fourteenth Amendment violations arising out of a series of actions
77
he viewed as retaliatory.
The Court again recognized the challenge of balancing public
employees’ protected speech rights against the need for government services to be provided efficiently, asserting that “[s]o long as
employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are neces78
sary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”
Nevertheless, the Court found that Ceballos was not speaking as a
citizen for purposes of the First Amendment. It was not dispositive
for the Court that Ceballos expressed his views in the office, nor
was it dispositive that he was specifically speaking on the subject
79
matter of his employment. Ultimately, what mattered was that
Ceballos, in writing the memo, was acting pursuant to his duties as
an employee and therefore not subject to the Pickering balancing
80
test. The Garcetti Court thus erected a critical distinction between
speech made as a citizen and speech made as an employee.81

72. Id.
73. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
74. Id. at 421.
75. Id. at 413–15.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 415.
78. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 420–21.
80. Id. at 421–22.
81. See Estlund, supra note 62, at 116 for a thorough discussion of the Garcetti Court’s
construction of “spheres of citizenship and of employment.”
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C. Doctrinal Conflict
In each of the post-Pickering cases, the Court narrowed individual employee speech rights in the name of employer discretion and
efficiency. While the Court has consistently recognized the challenging line-drawing problems presented by the holdings in these
decisions, it has nevertheless upheld them, recognizing the validity
of the competing interests at stake. 82
This delineation is significantly more complicated in the wake of
Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Janus. Arguably, the expansive
conception of matters of public concern that Justice Alito articulates in Janus creates space for significantly more litigants to meet
the Pickering threshold inquiry. Justice Kagan raised precisely this
point in her dissent:
So take your pick. Either the majority is exposing government entities across the country to increased First Amendment litigation and liability—and thus preventing them
from regulating their workforces as private employers
could. Or else, when actual cases of this kind come around,
we will discover that today’s majority has crafted a “unions
83
only” carve-out to our employee-speech law.
Per Justice Kagan, the very activity that makes public employee union collective bargaining inherently political under Justice Alito’s
analysis would also be considered First Amendment-protected
speech if it were to be raised in the context of an individual public
employee speech claim analyzed under Pickering. Or, as law professor Catherine Fisk succinctly explained, “There is now a First
Amendment right to refuse to engage in speech (paying union
fees) where there is no First Amendment right to engage in the
speech (about wages and benefits) that the person has a right not
84
to subsidize.”

82. For a thorough account of post-Pickering cases, see Joseph Oluwole, On the Road to
Garcetti: ‘Unpick’ering Pickering and Its Progeny, 36 CAP. U.L. REV. 967 (2008) (arguing that
the Supreme Court’s post-Pickering decisions have “regressively led to a quick ebb of free
speech rights” and jurisprudence that strongly favors operational efficiency over the individual speech rights of employees).
83. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2496
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
84. Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as Prologue,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2074–75 (2018).
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II. THE SOCIAL VALUE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
In this section, I will discuss a key aspect of Justice Souter’s dissent in Garcetti and how it highlights a longstanding view, on the
Court and in First Amendment scholarship, of the unique value of
public employee speech on workplace matters. The Court has articulated that principle and acknowledged its significance, but has
not explicitly reflected that value in its balancing test for public
employee speech on matters of public concern. I will conclude by
highlighting the piecemeal solutions scholars have suggested as attempts to carve out areas of protected speech that merit heightened protection and by offering arguments as to why a more comprehensive solution to the problem of public employee speech
rights post-Janus is preferable.
In his dissenting opinion in Garcetti, Justice Souter argued that
the mere act of receiving a public paycheck does nothing to dimin85
ish the value of public employees’ speech on public matters. In
fact, given that the First Amendment protects not only the individual speaking but the public’s interest in that speech, the value of
public employee speech on matters related to his official duties
86
“may well be greater.” Consequently, Justice Souter would have
rejected the categorical exclusion laid out by the majority in favor
of an adjustment to the basic Pickering balancing test: “[A]n employee commenting on subjects in the course of duties should not
prevail on balance unless he speaks on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the way he
87
does it.”
While the Garcetti majority did not adopt Souter’s proposed analytic framework, it acknowledged “the importance of promoting
the public’s interest in receiving the well-informed views of gov88
ernment employees engaging in civic discussion.” As law professor and labor and employment law scholar Cynthia Estlund notes,
while the Court has been divided over whether individuals have a
specific interest in protected speech, it has not been divided in its
89
position over the value of that speech. Indeed, the Court has consistently acknowledged the unique role of public servants commenting on matters of public concern, both before and after Gar90
cetti. Despite its apparent commitment to the social value of
85. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 430–31.
87. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 419 (majority opinion).
89. Estlund, supra note 62, at 141–42.
90. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (acknowledging that
“[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for
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public employee speech, its own recognition of that value in Garcet91
ti seems to be little more than “lip service.”
A. Proposals for Protection
In light of the apparent value of certain public employee speech,
scholars and commentators have highlighted problems unique to
specific categories of speech or speakers. They have proposed targeted solutions to confront these issues and to heighten speech
protections in these tailored circumstances.
1. Whistleblowers & Leakers
Much has been written on the critical role whistleblowers play in
American self-governance, and the Supreme Court itself has
92
acknowledged their particular importance. However, the Court
has failed to recognize in a consistent, meaningful way the value of
public employee speech to public discourse in its doctrine. In light
of this failure, law professor Ronald Krotoszynski recently proposed creating a new category of speech, which he calls “whistle93
blowing speech.” Krotoszynski argues for adopting a “modified
94
Hand formula” in which a court would weigh the “gravity of the
wrongdoing exposed by the government employee’s whistleblowing speech” against the “probability of it being reported or discov95
ered by another source.”
Similar arguments promote stronger First Amendment protections for government employees who leak confidential information
obtained in the course of their official duties. Heidi Kitrosser, law
professor and scholar of the law and policy of government secrecy,
96
has suggested two standards for litigation against leakers. The
first, applied during criminal prosecutions or civil actions “with

which they work” but holding that a government need only have a reasonable belief that an
employee made a sufficiently disruptive statement); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379
(2014) (holding that the First Amendment protects truthful sworn testimony, compelled by
subpoena, that occurs outside of ordinary job responsibilities, asserting that “anyone who
testifies in court bears an obligation to the court and society at large, to tell the truth”).
91. Larry Spurgeon, The Endangered Citizen Servant: Garcetti vs. the Public Interest and Academic Freedom, 39 J.C. & U.L. 405, 424–25 (2013).
92. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
93. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Whistleblowing Speech and the First Amendment, 93 IND. L.J. 267,
274 (2018).
94. Id. at 298.
95. Id. at 298 n.156.
96. Heidi Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment: New Developments and a
Closer Look at the Feasibility of Protecting Leakers, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1221, 1264 (2015).
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substantial sanctions,” would require the government to show that
a leaker “lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the
public interest in disclosure outweighed identifiable national secu97
rity harms.” The second, applied to actions with less severe sanctions, would require the government to show that “the leaker
98
lacked an objectively substantial basis” to believe the same.
2. Academic Freedom
The Garcetti majority opinion left open the possibility that its
analysis may apply differently to cases involving academic speech
related to scholarship or teaching. 99 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Garcetti’s application to academic speech has been a point of discussion
100
and concern amongst legal academics. In an effort to fill the gap
the Supreme Court deliberately left open, law professor Joseph J.
Martins proposes a modified balancing test that presumptively
101
weighs in favor of public school professors. In published commentary, practitioner Kimberly Gee proposes a modified Hazelwood
102
test, in which the school first conducts a forum analysis in order
to determine whether the school intended the classroom to be an
103
open or closed forum. If it is determined that the forum is a
closed one, the teacher would then be subjected to regulations that
104
are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests.”
3. Law Enforcement Officers
Others have proposed law-enforcement specific protections.
These arguments highlight the perverse incentives the Garcetti rule

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (“We need not, and for that reason
do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a
case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”).
100. See, e.g., Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment
Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945 (2009); see also Robert M.
O’Neil et al., Protecting an Independent Faculty Voice: Academic Freedom after Garcetti v. Ceballos,
95 ACADEME 67 (Nov.–Dec. 2009).
101. Joseph J. Martins, Tipping the Pickering Balance, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649,
680 (2016).
102. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that students’
rights were not violated when the school interfered with the paper’s content without the
student authors’ and editors’ consent because the school newspaper was not a public forum).
103. Kimberly Gee, Establishing a Constitutional Standard that Protects Public School Teacher
Classroom Expression, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 409, 449 (2009).
104. Id. at 450
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imposes on law enforcement officers, a class of employees from
whom the public has a significant interest in hearing truthful ac105
counts of misconduct or mismanagement. For these reasons,
professor Ann Hodges and independent practitioner Justin Pugh
have suggested a return to the Pickering framework as it was applied
106
pre-Garcetti. Similarly, in a journal comment, student Lemay Diaz
highlights the value to the public of truthful testimony provided by
police officers and other law enforcement officials, and suggests
that truthful testimony provided even in the course of one’s official
duties be considered protected citizen speech. 107
4. Lawyers
Given lawyers’ proximity to the judicial system and the public’s
interest in ethical, well-functioning courts, lawyers are arguably in
the best position to inform the public about problems within the
108
judiciary. Consequently, law professor Terri Day has proposed
reforming ethical restrictions on attorneys, noting that existing re109
strictions have a chilling effect on socially advantageous speech.
Common to all of these proposals is the notion that specific
types of public employee speech have unique value to public discourse, whether based upon situation- or profession-specific factors. The proposals for reform, however, range from ethical rule
reform to abandoning Garcetti entirely. These disparate solutions to
what appears to be a common underlying problem highlight the
need for a more comprehensive rule change that can accommodate the fact-specific proposals in a holistic fashion.
III. A PICKERING TEST FOR THE POST-JANUS WORLD
In Janus, the Court broadened the scope of what constitutes a
matter of public concern while weakening the citizen/employee
distinction of Garcetti. In his majority opinion, Justice Alito did not
appear concerned with this conflict, distinguishing Pickering from

105. Ann Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law Enforcement
Officers Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 39 (June 2018).
106. Id. at 31.
107. Lemay Diaz, Comment, Truthful Testimony as the “Quintessential Example of Speech as a
Citizen”: Why Lane v. Franks Lays the Groundwork for Protecting Public Employee Truthful Testimony, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 565, 566–67 (2016).
108. Terri Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v. the First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 161,
164 (2008).
109. Id. at 175.
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110
Abood as an issue of scale. For Justice Alito, it mattered greatly
that cases decided under Pickering revolve around individual employment disputes, while Janus (and, by connection, Abood) dealt
111
with blanket, employer-issued policies affecting many employees.
But this response assumes the existence of a line, determined by
“scale,” while providing lower courts with no reasonable way to discern where that line might be drawn. Furthermore, Justice Alito’s
strong emphasis on scale renders the Garcetti citizen/employee distinction nearly meaningless. The Garcetti distinction relies on the
role of the speaker in determining whether the implicated speech is
protected. If speech that is otherwise protected becomes unprotected merely when articulated collectively, the core protection is
rather weak, indeed. The doctrinal uncertainty Janus creates calls
for a new test–one that recognizes the unique category of citizenas-public-employee and the special value this perspective brings.
In an attempt to offer such a comprehensive framework, I propose that the Supreme Court adopt a modified Pickering balancing
test that highlights the public’s interest, under the First Amendment, in the speech of public employees. This modified test should
explicitly adopt a third factor to balance: the “social value” of the
specific employee speech at issue and its benefit to public discourse. This factor would be of equal weight to the employee’s
right to comment on matters of public concern and the government’s right to operate an effective and efficient workplace.
The Court has repeatedly articulated its commitment to the value of employee speech to the public and to civic discourse generally. Basic theories of representative democracy, citizenship, and
equality support the Court’s recognition of the public’s interest in
public employee speech and that speech’s unique value to the public. The Janus dissent concludes with the notion that the First
Amendment was meant to protect democratic governance, a point
112
discussed at length in legal scholarship. For example, law professor and noted First Amendment scholar Vincent Blasi famously
promoted the important “checking value” that free speech has on

110. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2472–73 (2018) (“Suppose that a single employee complains that he or she should have received a 5% raise. This individual complaint would likely constitute a matter of only private
concern and would therefore be unprotected under Pickering. But a public-sector union’s
demand for a 5% raise for the many thousands of employees it represents would be another
matter entirely. . . . When a large number of employees speak through their union, the category of speech that is of public concern is greatly enlarged, and the category of speech that
is of only private concern is substantially shrunk.”).
111. Id. at 2457.
112. Id. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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113

government functions. More recently, law professor and workplace law expert Pauline Kim has written extensively on the public
114
accountability value of employee speech. Cynthia Estlund writes
115
on the “civic significance of public employment,” and professor
Samuel Bagenstos argues there is social equality value to strong
116
employee protections, including speech protections. The significant public, social, and civic value of public employee speech has
enjoyed longstanding constitutional, judicial, and scholarly support. Incorporating those principles into the Pickering balancing
test as administered by an independent judiciary merely reflects
those principles and furthers those goals.
Despite the theoretical foundations for the Court’s recognition
of the value of employee speech, the Court’s actual implementation of those values has remained ambivalent, often buried in dic117
ta. Instituting this proposed test would give greater, more substantial weight to this important aspect of the First Amendment,
creating space for more expansive employee speech protections. It
would be consistent with the expanded scope of public concern in
Janus and the weakened line between employee and citizen speech,
but would still avoid the Connick Court’s concern of constitutional118
izing the employee grievance.
This modified test is preferable to carving out the specific areas
of heightened protection outlined in Section II because of its
comprehensiveness. At the same time, it accommodates those areas
and addresses those concerns. For example, consider a whistleblower employed by a government body who faces adverse action
for raising concerns about official misconduct. The employee
brings suit to object to that punishment. Nothing necessarily protects the employee from punishment beyond the piecemeal landscape of whistleblower protection statutes. Under the existing Pickering framework, a court could find that the government’s interest
in maintaining a secure workplace far exceeds the individual em113. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521, 527, 534 (1977).
114. Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace, 94
N.C. L. REV. 601, 601 (2016).
115. Estlund, supra note 62, at 116–17.
116. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 225
(2013).
117. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S.
563, 572 (1968) (suggesting that teachers are most likely to have “informed and definite”
opinions about school expenditures and that it is accordingly “essential” that their free
speech rights are preserved, but not discussing the value of their opinions further); Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428–29 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that First Amendment protections for government employees regarding potential government misconduct
“rests on something more” and is uniquely valuable).
118.
See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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ployee’s right to that speech. But under the modified test and the
third “social value” prong, courts could recognize the speech’s significant value to the public, tipping the Pickering balance in favor of
the discharged employee. The same goes for lawyers and law enforcement officers who publicize misconduct within their respective professions; the ability for courts to explicitly recognize the
public value inherent to this speech would elevate these claims
from routine employee/employer disputes to speech that serves
the public good and emphasize that the speech should be protected as such.
Underlying each of those profession- or situation-specific proposals is a recognition of the potential for public interest in and
social value of the speech at issue. This proposed test is therefore a
more flexible solution than the piecemeal exceptions. It allows for
the aforementioned and other fact-specific circumstances to be
addressed, permits judicial discretion, and facilitates the development of a more consistent body of law.
Importantly, the test would not “constitutionalize the employee
119
grievance.” Simple disputes over routine workplace matters specific to individuals are unlikely to have any cognizable public or social value. The proposed third Pickering prong, then, would not factor into a court’s decision, and the court would proceed as it
otherwise would by weighing employee rights against employer
prerogative. Similarly, speech by a public employee in the workplace that arguably constitutes harassment or hate speech would be
no more protected in this framework than in the existing Pickering
framework, as such speech would have no social value or benefit to
public discourse.
Reformulating this longstanding test naturally raises some concerns regarding implementation, judicial overreach, and Justice
Alito’s focus on the matter of scale. These concerns, however, are
surmountable, and none outweigh the benefits of the proposed reformulated test.
The Supreme Court should explicitly adopt the modified threeprong Pickering test if given the opportunity. The test alone admittedly does not provide much guidance or structure to the lower
courts that will be tasked with implementing it, but lower courts
should be affirmatively given flexibility to provide content to the
new “social value” prong. Flexibility is one of the key benefits of
this test over other piecemeal solutions that have been proposed.
Cases arising under workplace speech claims are very fact specific
and require flexible solutions. In light of the need for specificity

119.

Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
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and flexibility, lower courts should be given freedom to develop
the new social value prong, as they are the courts of first instance
with direct access to the facts of a case. Lower courts would thus be
able to tailor the new prong to the wide range of fact-specific cases
while still upholding the Court’s longstanding interest in the social
value of public employee speech. In doing so, courts will develop a
body of case law that gives content and shape to the category of
what may constitute speech of such social value.
Concerns with lower courts’ implementation of the revised test
also suggest hesitation with judicial overreach and policymaking, as
there may be risks inherent in setting judges free to evaluate the
“social value” of speech with little guidance, oversight, or limitations. The majority opinion in Garcetti found existing “whistleblower protection laws and labor codes . . . available to those who seek
to expose wrongdoing” to be satisfactory, offering sufficient protec120
tion for whistleblowing employees. Heightened constitutional
protection (which would presumably have been administered by
the judiciary) was therefore not warranted. This was a poorly supported and shortsighted conclusion. The courts cannot reasonably
defer to elected officials on speech claims that arise when those officials, or those subject to appointment or removal by elected officials, are operating in a managerial capacity. This is particularly
true when the speech at issue reflects negatively on the government or individual implicated actors. There is apparent conflict
between public officials’ obligations to the public interest and their
interest in self-preservation, career advancement, and reputation.
It is unreasonable to expect government actors themselves to protect the public’s interest in this way, and it is therefore appropriate
to permit judicial intervention in the form of a judicially administered test to uphold these fundamental rights.
Even if one does not believe that public officials will face perverse incentives if left solely responsible for enacting and enforcing
robust whistleblower protection laws, the existing web of statutory
protections for whistleblowers is nonetheless insufficient to protect
the broad range of socially valuable public employee speech. Much
valuable speech falls outside of the scope of official whistleblowing
“defined in the classic sense of exposing an official’s fault to a third
121
party or to the public,” as Souter discusses in his Garcetti dissent.
In deciding that agency fees represent unconstitutionally compelled speech, the Janus majority opinion itself discusses the wideranging issues of public concern addressed in collective bargaining

120.
121.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
Id. at 440 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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agreements, including “sensitive political subjects” like “education,
122
child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights.” Public employees
may have unique insights into these issues by virtue of their proximity and access to civic institutions; their speech on such issues
deserves protection beyond that afforded to whistleblowers as they
are traditionally understood.
As previously discussed, Justice Alito relies heavily on the issue of
scale in determining whether public employee union speech constitutes a matter of concern. It could be argued that the proposed
test does not sufficiently respond to Justice Alito’s concern with
scale as a key fact distinguishing speech of public employee unions
from individual claims, and thereby does little to resolve the linedrawing problem that Justice Alito’s position creates. However, as
discussed, Justice Alito’s line is neither clear nor a given; if four
Supreme Court justices expressed such vigorous dissent and confusion at the line, that delineation is arguably not intuitive. If scale
considerations alone are not clear or sufficient, judges must be
drawing on some other assessment in making their determinations
as to what constitutes a matter of public concern. What this modified test provides, then, is a more concrete avenue through which
judges can articulate the implicit but unstated assessments they are
making when they designate topics as matters of public concern.
Judges should be forced to articulate these processes of reasoning.
This modified test provides a workable framework that forces them
to do so explicitly.
CONCLUSION
Janus v. AFSCME Council 31 has thrown public employee First
Amendment doctrine into disarray. By collapsing Garcetti’s citizen/employee speech distinction and broadening the scope of
speech that addresses matters of public concern, the Supreme
Court at best created confusion for the lower courts. At worst, it
created Kagan’s feared “unions-only” carve-out to employee speech
protections. A clarification is therefore necessary—one that is consistent not only with the changes made in Janus, but also with the
Court’s longstanding recognition of the value of public employee
speech to public discourse. A modified Pickering test that explicitly
balances the public interest value of public employee speech would
give the Court’s seemingly disparate decisions some ideological

122. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2475–76 (2018).

692

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:3

consistency and, importantly, would reaffirm a respect for the critical role of First Amendment speech protections in democratic selfgovernance and the unique role of a public servant therein.

